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REFLECTIONS ON ALFRED BILL'S 
"TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE AND 
FAIR TRIAL" 
Peter Westen* 
The clash between testimonial privileges and the Sixth 
Amendment is becoming increasingly common. A criminal de-
fendant, exercising his Sixth Amendment right to examine wit-
nesses for evidence in his defense, puts questions to a witness; 
the witness, asserting a testimonial privilege to remain silent, 
refuses to answer. The privilege may belong to the government, 
such as a national security privilege, or to a private party, such 
as the lawyer-client privilege. The privilege may have its source 
in the Constitution, a statute, or common law, and may be as-
serted on either cross or direct examination. Whatever the con-
text, courts asked to resolve this conflict face a similar task: 
weighing the constitutional interest of the defendant in securing 
exculpatory evidence against the interest of the witness in pre-
serving confidentiality. 
In resolving such conflicts, federal courts tend to give consid-
erable weight to a defendant's interest in discovering and intro-
ducing exculpatory evidence on his behalf.1 Commentators gen-
erally applaud this trend.1 The applause, however, has not 
passed without dissent. In a recent article, "Testimonial Privi-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School B.A., 1964, Harvard Univer-
sity; J.D., 1968, University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Professor Rob-
ert Weisberg of Stanford for his generosity and insight in reading and commenting upon 
an earlier draft of the article. 
' See authorities cited in Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitu-
tional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 lowA L. Rav. 741, 769 n.24 (1981). See also 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) ("Few rights are more fundamental 
than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."). 
• See Clinton, The Right To Present A Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guar-
antee In Criminal Trials, 9 bm. L. R.Bv. 711, 815-30 (1976); Note, Defendant v. Witness: 
Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communi-
cations Privileges, 30 STAN. L. R.Bv. 935 (1978). See also Note, "The Public Has A Claim 
To Every Man's Evidence": The Defendant's Constitutional Right To Witness Immu-
nity, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1224-30 (1978). 
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lege and Fair Trial,"8, ~rofessor Alfred Hill comes to some revi-
sionist conclusions about the balance between defendant and 
witness in criminal. cases. His revisions fall into three general 
areas . 
. First, he questions the commonplace remedy of ordering wit-
nesses to testify in derogation of testimonial privileges. In his 
view, courts nowadays resort to compelled testimony as a rem-
edy "on the theory that nothing less [will] do to protect the con-
stitutional rights of the accused."" He questions this "theory," 
arguing that the remedy of compelled testimony is either exces-
sive or inadequate: excessive, because the rights of an accused 
can be safeguarded equally well by the remedy of compelled dis-
missal; inadequate, because the rights of a defendant cannot be 
fulfilled if a recalcitrant witness willfully violates an order to 
testify. 
Second, and wholly aside from the question of remedy, he 
- questions the established right of a defendant to seek relief from 
asse.rtions of private privilege by his own witnesses. In his view, 
the :right to relief rests on a paradox: either a defendant can 
show in advance that a privileged witness possesses exculpatory 
evidence, or he cannot make such a showing. One who can make 
such an evidentiary showing by hypothesis already possesses 
everything he needs; hence, his claim for further testimony must 
be deemed superfluous. One who cannot make· such a showing 
does not possess what he needs to override the privilege; hence, 
his claim for relief must be deemed inadequate. In either event, 
he ·cannot complain about the witness' assertion of privilege. 
Third, Professor Hill questions the commonplace tendency to 
treat assertions of privilege as a single problem. In his view, 
prosecution witnesses should be treated differently from defense 
witnesses, and government privileges should be treated differ-
ently from private privileges. Thus, a defendant who has no 
right to relief from an assertion of private privilege by his own 
witness may be entitled to relief under the same circumstances 
from (1) an assertion of privilege by a prosecution witness, and 
(2) an assertion of government privilege by a witness for the 
defense. 
I have learned a great deal from "Testimonial Privilege and 
Fair Trial"-as I always do from Professor Hill's work. Indeed, 
he has changed my way of thinking in this area in several impor-
tant respects. At the same time, I come to rather different con-
• Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial, 80 CoLUM. L. RBv. 1173 (1980). 
• Id. at 1173. 
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clusions than he regarding each of his three major topics. Part I 
of this article examines the problem of finding a "remedy" for 
testimonial privileges that violate a defendant's right to a fair 
trial. Part II discusses the problem of determining when a defen-
dant is entitled to assert that the "right" has been violated. 
Finally, Part III analyzes the problem of distinguishing for pur-
poses of entitlement between prosecution witnesses and govern-
ment privileges on the one hand, and defense witnesses asserting 
private privileges on the other hand. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF REMEDY 
Professor Hill takes as his point of departure a "novel" line of 
recent decisions that appear to him to be "plainly wrong. "11 As 
he reads them, the decisions stand for the proposition that when 
testimonial privileges deny a defendant a constitutionally fair 
trial, the proper constitutional remedy is to compel the witness 
to testify rather than to dismiss the prosecution. Professor Hill 
objects to these decisions (as he reads them) on substantive as 
well as formal grounds: substantive, because he believes that 
given the nature of the defendant's claim of right, the remedy of 
compelling a witness to testify in derogation of a privilege both 
goes too far and, ironically, sometimes fails to go far enough; for-
mal, because he believes that given a conflict between a witness' 
claim of privilege and a defendant's right to a fair trial, a rem-
edy can always be framed in nonconstitutional terms without 
resorting to constitutional adjudication. 
As usual, Professor Hill analyzes this problem in an original 
and provocative manner. Indeed, his comments are sufficiently 
rich in insight that they could probably be restated in such a 
manner to remove most grounds for disagreement. Yet, as pres-
ently stated, both his substantive and formal objections seem to 
me to be misleading, if not mistaken. 
A. The Substantive Objection: The Constitutional Remedy 
of Compelling Testimony In Derogation of a Privilege 
Professor Hill's substantive objection, while analytically cor-
rect, appears to be premised on a strawman. He proceeds on the 
premise that courts nowadays order witnesses to testify in dero-
•Id.at 1180. 
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gation of claims of privilege in lieu of the alternative remedy of 
allowing the case to be dismissed. 8 On the basis of that premise, 
he concludes that these court-ordered remedies exceed constitu-
tional norms. 7 Professor Hill is entirely correct in his conclusion. 
With respect to constitutional claims to a fair criminal trial, no 
justification exists an constitutional grounds alone8 for insisting 
on compelled testimony in lieu of the alternative remedy of dis-
missal. The defendant in such cases does not assert a right to 
compel privileged testimony as such, but a right not to be con-
victed unless the court compels such testimony. A defendant 
who demonstrates that an assertion of privilege would deny him 
a fair trial is constitutionally indifferent as to remedy. Either 
compelling the witness to testify or accepting the prosecution's 
dismissal of its case will entirely vindicate the defendant's fair 
trial rights. Given the defendant's constitutional indifference as 
between the two remedies, a court cannot rely on constitutional 
grounds alone for compelling testimony in the face of a prosecu-
tion's preference for dismissing the case. A court that insists 
upon either the one alternative or the other as an exclusive con-
stitutional remedy exceeds constitutional requirements in reme-
dying the constitutional injury at issue. 9 
8 As Professor Hill puts it, "state courts have required the testimony of the witness in 
derogation of a privilege, on the theory that nothing less would do to protect the consti-
tutional rights of the accused." Id. at 1173 (emphasis added). It is fair to assume that he 
would distinguish a case in which a court puts the prosecution to the choice between 
either proceeding with its case (thus compelling a third-party witness to testify in dero-
gation of a private privilege) or dismissing or otherwise altering its case against the ac-
cused (thus permitting the witness to stand on his claim of privilege), because he distin-
guishes Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), on that ground. See Hill, supra note 3, at 
1178. 
• Hill, supra note 3, at 1176 ("an act of judicial usurpation"). See also Hill, The Bill of 
Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 181, 214-15 (1969). 
• This is not to say that there is never any legal ground for insisting on compelling 
testimony in lieu of dismissing a case. As I discuss later, the choice of remedy depends 
upon the content of the domestic law. See notes 44-49 and accompanying text infra. 
Accordingly, if the legislature has made it clear that it prefers the remedy of compelling 
testimony to the remedy of dismissal, the courts have a nonconstitutional legal obligation 
to compel testimony in lieu of dismissing the case. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that while a court is never justified on fair trial grounds 
alone in insisting upon the remedy of compelling testimony, it is not justified in doing so 
on any other constitutional ground. The most I mean to say is that as far as constitu-
tional rights to fair trial are concerned, the remedies of compelling testimony and dis-
missing the prosecution are constitutionally interchangeable. With respect to individual 
privileges, there may well be independent constitutional grounds for insisting on one 
remedy or the other. Thus, it might be argued that the priest-penitent privilege is consti-
tutionally based, and that its nature is such that courts are constitutionally compelled to 
resolve conflicts between a priest-penitent privilege and fair trial by dismissing the pros-
ecution. For further discussion of these points, see notes 9 & 13 infra. 
• See Westen, supra note 1, at 767 n.19. 
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The problem with Professor Hill's argument is not its conclu-
sion, but its premise. It is not true that courts are compelling 
disclosure of privileged information on the "theory" that "noth-
ing less [ will] do to protect the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused. "10 Indeed, as far as I know, no court on constitutional 
grounds has ever ordered a witness to testify over a claim of 
privilege in lieu of allowing the prosecution to dismiss its case. 
Instead, the cases are all ones in which the court either explic-
itly instructs the prosecution to choose between the issuance of 
an order to testify or dismissal of the case, or implicitly does so 
by conditioning further prosecution on the issuance of such an 
order. Rather than compel testimony as an exclusive constitu-
tional remedy, courts invariably require the prosecution to 
choose on nonconstitutional grounds between one of two alterna-
tive remedies: either to accept an order compelling the witness 
to testify or, alternatively, to dismiss its case against the 
accused.11 
Professor Hill's principal case, In re Farber, 12 provides a good 
example. Dr. Mario Jascalevich, a defendant accused of murder, 
attempted to subpoena Myron Farber's newspaper article notes 
in the face of the latter's assertion of a newsman's privilege 
under a state "shield law." The trial judge in Farber did not rule 
that Dr. Mario Jascalevich would be entitled to subpoena Far-
ber's notes even if the criminal case against him were dropped. 
Nor did the judge rule that the criminal case against the defen-
dant would continue even if the prosecution preferred to dismiss 
it. Rather, the trial judge ruled that Dr. Jascalevich could not 
It is worth emphasizing that we are talking here only about what the Constitution 
requires in the way of remedy. The Constitution does not require either dismissal or 
disclosure. What it requires is one or the other. The court, nevertheless, has an obliga-
tion to pick on nonconstitutional grounds whichever remedy the legislature prefers under 
the circumstances. For a discussion of the standards that govern the selection of remedy 
on a nonconstitutional level, see notes 19-31 and accompanying text infra. 
10 Hill, supra note 3, at 1173. 
11 Courts sometimes explicitly notify the prosecution of its option to avoid compelled 
testimony by "voluntarily" dismissing its case. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 
165, 181 (1969); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 65 n.15 (1957). In most cases, 
there is no need to advise the prosecution of its power to avoid the consequences of 
continued trial by dismissing its case, because the prosecution knows full well that it 
always has that option. Indeed, courts are so reluctant (or so unable) to compel the pros-
ecution to proceed with a case that the prosecution wishes to drop that they tend to read 
out of existence rules of court that require the prosecution to obtain "leave" of court 
before dismissing a case. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977). On the issue of the inability of the 
courts to compel the executive branch of government to prosecute a criminal case over 
the prosecutor's objections, see note 31 infra. 
11 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). 
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fairly be tried unless Farber produced the privileged material for 
in camera inspection and hence, that Dr. Jascalevich was enti-
tled to subpoena the notes as long as the prosecution persisted 
in pressing its case against him. The court thus delegated to the 
prosecution the nonconstitutional choice between continuing 
with the trial (thus accepting the remedy of in camera inspec-
tion), or allowing Farber to stand on his privilege (thus ac-
cepting the remedy of dismissal). The trial court eventually en-
forced the subpoena not because the court insisted upon 
disclosure as an exclusive remedy, but because the prosecution 
had implicitly rejected the alternative remedy by opting on non-
constitutional grounds to proceed with its case. 
To be sure, one can argue on nonconstitutional grounds that 
courts misinterpret legislative intent when they delegate the 
choice of remedies to the prosecution (in lieu of retaining the 
choice themselves). Similarly, one can argue on nonconstitu-
tional grounds that prosecutors misinterpret legislative intent 
when they resolve the choice in favor of pressing their cases (in 
lieu of dismissing them). These are issues to be discussed later.18 
The present point is that these nonconstitutional issues have 
nothing to do with the objection that courts nowadays are order-
ing witnesses to testify as an exclusive rather than as an alter-
native constitutional remedy. The answer to that objection is 
straightforward: courts nowadays are doing no such thing. 
Courts are not compelling witnesses to testify unless (1) the 
courts decide on nonconstitutional grounds to delegate the 
choice of remedies to the prosecution and (2) the prosecution 
then responds to the authorized choice by opting to press its 
case. Witnesses who are thus compelled to testify do so because 
of the very truths Professor Hill wishes to establish: that the 
right to a fair trial can be satisfied by alternative remedies; that 
the remedies of dismissal or disclosure are constitutionally inter-
changeable; that courts are no more justified on constitutional 
grounds alone in exclusively mandating dismissal than in exclu-
sively compelling testimony;u and that when courts delegate the 
choice of remedies to a prosecutor who responds by rejecting the 
remedy of dismissal, the courts are then constitutionally obliged 
to resort to the alternative remedy of compelling the witness to 
testify. 
•• See notes 19-31 and accompanying text infra. 
14 This is not to say that a court is never justified on nonconstitutional grounds in 
dismissing a case over the prosecution's objection. It is not only justified in doing so, it is 
legally obligated to do so whenever the legislature expresses a preference for dismissal as 
opposed to compelled testimony. See notes 21-31 and accompanying text infra. 
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Ironically, at this point in the discussion Professor Hill ap-
pears to switch directions by suggesting an objection that di-
verges from his orginal one. He objected originally that courts go 
too far in issuing unconditional orders to testify, in lieu of com-
bining such orders with alternatives for dismissal. His instant 
objection is that courts sometimes may not be going far enough 
in providing for the alternative remedies of disclosure or dismis-
sal. Alternative remedies, he suggests, may leave the defendant 
with the worst of both worlds. The prosecution may opt to press 
its case (thus denying the defendant the remedy of dismissal), 
and the witness may refuse to comply with the order to testify 
(thus denying the defendant the remedy of disclosure). Both oc-
curred in Farber when Myron Farber responded to the subpoena 
duces tecum by standing in contempt rather than testifying for 
Dr. Jascalevich in derogation of the newsman's privilege. In such 
cases, so the argument goes, the remedy of ordering witnesses to 
testify does not constitutionally remedy the defendant's right to 
a fair trial, because the order will sometimes result in the defen-
dant being convicted without ever having access to the privi- · 
leged information. u 
The foregoing argument rests upon an· erroneous assumption 
about the nature of the constitutional right to be remedied. The 
constitutional right at issue in these cas~s is the Sixth Amend-
ment right of a defendant to present a defense through wit-
nesses. If the right to present witnesses consisted of the right of 
a defendant actually to obtain everything exculpatory his wit-
nesses might know, then Professor Hill would be correct: the 
remedy of trying to elicit evidence from a recalcitrant witness by 
holding him· in contempt responds inadequately to a right that 
consists of successfully eliciting such evidence. In fact, though, a 
defendant's right to present evidence through witnesses is not a 
guarantee of success, but rather a right to insist that the govern-
ment uses its best efforts to assist the defendant in securing evi-
dence in his defense. The state exhausts its obligations - as 
well as the defendant's rights - by doing everything possible to 
induce such witnesses to testify.16 
'" I infer this argument from Professor Hill's statement that the remedy of dismissal 
(and the remedy of striking a witness' testimony) is "normally superior" to the remedy 
of ordering a privileged witness to testify because if the witness persists in refusing to 
testify (as Myron Farber did), the "court's action ... contribute[s) not an iota to the 
defendant's ultimate vindication." Hill, supra note 3, at 1176. 
11 See Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 Mice. L. RBv. 1186, 1196-97 (1979). 
Obviously, this is not to say that residual constitutional standards governing the reliabil-
ity of evidence in criminal cases do not exist. There are such minimal constitutional 
standards. The point is that those standards apply not simply to the hearsay statements 
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This point can be readily illustrated by reference to the law 
governing nonprivileged witnesses. Assume that the prosecution 
wishes to introduce an out-of-court statement of a witness who 
has since died or otherwise become unavailable, or that a defen-
dant wishes to subpoena a witness who has died or lost his mem-
ory. If the Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and com-
pulsory process consisted of a guarantee that the government 
actually succeed in producing witnesses, a defendant would be 
entitled to relief in each of the foregoing instances. In reality, a 
defendant is not entitled to relief in such instances unless he can 
show that the government has either failed to make appropriate 
efforts to secure the witness' testimony or has itself caused the 
witness to become unavailable. The right to produce witnesses is 
not a right to succeed in securing witnesses, but at most a right 
to insist that the state make reasonable good faith efforts to se-
cure witnesses for the defense. The same holds for privileged 
witnesses. A defendant cannot complain when the state genu-
inely tries but fails to compel defense witnesses to testify, be-
cause the defendant is not entitled to demand success. He is 
only entitled to demand that the state try to succeed.17 
Government privileges operate in the same way. In the event 
an assertion of government privilege denies a defendant a fair 
trial, the government must choose between dismissing its case or 
waiving its privilege. The government's decision to proceed with 
the prosecution creates an obligation· to waive its privilege and, 
hence, to use its best efforts to induce the witness to testify. If 
the witness then persists in refusing to testify, the court must 
decide whether the contemptuous witness is acting in accor-
dance with government wishes or as a renegade witness.on a 
frolic of his own. In the event it finds the former, the court may 
invoke a variety of sanctions, including the sanction of involun-
of unavailable witnesses, but to euery item of the state's evidence, direct as well as indi-
rect; and that the standards have their source not in the witness clauses in the Sixth 
Amendment, but in the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
See id. at 1198-1203. 
17 See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) (government has no obli-
gation under the compulsory process clause to produce evidence for the defense that has 
become lost through no fault of its own); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 726 (1968) (the 
state has an obligation under the confrontation clause to make "a good faith effort to 
obtain" the presence of witnesses whose statements it uses against the accused); Mattox 
v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 161 (1892) (state has no obligation under the confronta-
tion clause to produce a declarant who has since died). See generally Westen, Confron-
tation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Euidence for Criminal Cases, 91 
HARV. L. REv. 667, 696 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Confrontation); Westen, Compulsory 
Process II, 74 Mice. L. Rsv. 191, 228 n.129 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Compulsory Pro-
cess II]. 
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tary dismissal. Courts use dismissal in such cases, however, not 
as a remedy for violation of a defendant's right to succeed in 
obtaining evidence, but as a sanction on the government for fail-
ing to try its best to obtain evidence from a witness under its 
control. Dismissal becomes an ~ppropriate sanction because the 
party responsible for the witness's contempt and the party pros-
ecuting the case happen to be one and the same.18 
In conclusion, the remedy of compelling a witness to testify is 
never constitutionally inadequate from a defendant's standpoint 
if it is combined with the alternative remedy of dismissal. For 
even if the prosecution opts to proceed with the case and the 
witness thereafter refuses to testify, the· defendant's constitu-
tional rights regarding witnesses are fully satisfied by the state's 
expenditure of its best (though unsuccessful) efforts on his 
behalf. 
B. The Formal Objection: Nonconstitutional Remedies for 
Conff,icts Between Privilege Claims and Fair Trial Rights 
Professor Hill recognizes that there are cases in which a defen-
dant is, indeed, entitled to the remedy of compelling witnesses 
to testify over claims of privilege. He objects, however, to the 
practice of framing the remedy in such cases in constitutional 
form. He argues that a defendant's true entitlement to the rem-
edy of overriding a testimonial privilege arises because the legis-
lature or court that created the privilege intended it to be over-
ridden under such circumstances. Accordingly, a court that 
overrides a privilege in order to afford a defendant a fair trial 
should emphasize that its decision represents a nonconstitu-
tional interpretation of domestic law and not a constitutional 
mandate. In his own words: 
The [foregoing] analysis . . . is one that can be made, 
and indeed should be made, of all privileges created by 
constitution or by statute. If the privilege, fairly con-
strued, protects against requiring disclosure at all costs, 
then the judicial course is to uphold both the assertion of 
•• See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 260 at 533 n.39 (1969) 
(the sanction of involuntary dismissal is an appropriate sanction for violation by the 
federal government of its obligation under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure to make evidence available to the accused). See generally Note, The Emerging 
Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1033 
(1978). 
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the privilege and the claim of the defendant who has 
made a sufficient showing of constitutional prejudice. 
. . . If the privilege, as construed, does not have the 
reach the witness claims for it, there is no need to invali-
date the privilege, since it is simply inapplicable.19 
As is usually the case, Professor Hill's argument is rich in in-
sight. He is right that once a legislature decrees that a defen-
dant's legal right to present evidence prevails over the combina-
tion of a witness' statutory privilege and the state's interest in 
prosecuting him/10 the legislature's preferences as to remedy 
control the choice between disclosure and dismissal. By the same 
token, once a defendant's constitutional right to present evi-
dence is held to prevail over the combined interests of the wit-
ness and the prosecution, then again, the legislature's prefer-
ences control the choice as between the two constitutionally 
adequate remedies of disclosure or dismissal. Both are important 
points and Professor Hill should be credited as being the first to 
make them. 
Nonetheless, it is somewhat misleading for Professor Hill to 
say there is "no need" ever "to invalidate [a] privilege"11 on con-
stitutional grounds, because saying that erroneously implies that 
legal disputes between defendants, witnesses and the prosecu-
tion can be resolved on statutory grounds without implicating 
constitutional norms. In reality, the legislative choice between 
disclosure and dismissal only comes into play because of an an-
terior constitutional judgment that the state cannot both pursue 
its prosecution and sustain the witness' claim of privilege. The 
state, upon learning that it cannot constitutionally pursue its 
first preference for prosecution plus privilege, must then deter-
mine on nonconstitutional grounds its second-best preference as 
between dismissal or disclosure. But no one should be fooled as 
to the state's reasons for making the latter legislative choice: it 
makes the choice not because it wants to, but because it is con-
stitutionally required to do so. 
The process of fashioning remedies for equal protection viola-
tions provides a good analogy. Assume, for example, that a legis-
19 Hill, supra note 3, at 1176. 
90 In order to prevail on a fair trial claim, a defendant need not show that his fair trial 
interest is superior to both the state's interest in prosecution and the witneBB' interest in 
asserting the privilege. It suffices if he can show that his interest is superior to either one 
or the other, because after such a showing the state cannot insist on both prosecuting 
hint and allowing the witneBB to assert his privilege at the same tinte. 
11 Hill, supra note 3, at 1176. 
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lative rule grants women certain benefits that it denies to men. 
If a court determines the rule to be an unconstitutional denial of 
equal protection, the court must decide whether to remedy the 
violation by extending to men the benefits now enjoyed by 
women or by denying women the benefits now denied men. 
Since the two remedies are constitutionally interchangeable as 
far as norms of equality are concerned, the court should select 
whichever remedy it believes the legislature would prefer under 
the circumstances. H Yet the court does so in full recognition 
that the selected remedy does not truly represent the legisla-
ture's real preference, because the legislature's real preference is 
to grant the benefits to women while . denying them to men. 
From the legislature's perspective, the choice of remedies repre-
sents at best a choice of evils. The legislature makes the choice 
only because it is constitutionally compelled to do so. If the leg-
islature responds by extending the benefit to men, it does so be-
cause given its priorities, it has no other constitutional choice. 
That is what it means to say that the denial of benefits to men 
is "unconstitutional. "118 
The same analysis applies to testimonial privileges. A court, 
upon deciding that a criminal defendant cannot be fairly tried 
upon a witness' assertion of privilege, must decide whether the 
legislature would prefer the court to dismiss the case or to com-
pel the witness to testify. To describe this choice as purely "a 
matter of [legislative] construction"" misleads, however, be-
cause the legislature would not make the choice unless it were 
constitutionally compelled to do so. A legislature that responds 
by cutting back on the privilege does so because given the choice 
it is compelled to make, and given its priorities, it has no consti-
tutional alternative but to give up on the privilege. This, again, 
is what it means to say that a privilege has been constitutionally 
overridden. 16 
In any event, once a court determines that a defendant cannot 
be fairly tried in the face of an assertion of privilege, it must 
make a nonconstitutional choice between dismissal and disclo-
sure. Strangely enough, Professor Hill is ambivalent about how a 
court should go about making the election. On the one hand, he 
u See Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152-53 (1980). See gener-
ally Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legis-
lation, 28 CI.Ev. ST. L. RBv. 301, 317-18 (1980). 
u Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 641 (1975). 
.. Hill, supra note 3, at 1176 . 
.. See, e.g., Confrontation, supra note 17, at 626-27 (1978), quoted in Hill, supra note 
3, at 1194, n.93. 
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stresses the importance of "fairly"28 construing legislative intent. 
On the other hand, he sometimes seems partial to the remedy of 
dismissal, suggesting that a court can "readily"27 avoid overrid-
ing a testimonial privilege by simply dismissing the state's case. 
In reality, no justification exists for a court's making a unilateral 
decision to dismiss a prosecution over the state's objection un-
less the court truly believes that the legislature would pref er the 
rare remedy of mandatory dismissal to the more common rem-
edy of allowing the prosecution to choose between dismissal and 
disclosure. 
In practice, courts very rarely order the remedy of involuntary 
dismissal. I cannot recall a single instance in which a court has 
itself invoked the remedy of involuntary dismissal, as opposed to 
leaving the choice of remedies to the prosecution.28 Nor can I 
think of a single instance in which a legislature could reasonably 
be said to have intended to delegate decisions regarding dismis-
sal to the courts as opposed to the prosecution. 29 This represents 
an important distinction because leaving the choice of remedies 
to the prosecution amounts to compelling privileged witnesses to 
testify whenever the prosecution chooses to proceed with its 
case. 
It is no accident that courts refrain from dismissing cases over 
the prosecution's objections, for there are several reasons why ~ 
legislature would wish to delegate the choice of remedies to the 
prosecution rather than to the courts. First, the prosecution has 
experience in weighing the state's interest in prosecution against 
countervailing public policies (including policies regarding pri-
vacy), because it regularly makes such assessments in the tradi-
tional exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 80 Second, in the event 
18 Hill, supra note 3, at 1176. 
07 Id. at 1178. 
•• For an illustration of the reluctance of courts to resort to the remedy of involuntary 
dismissal in criminal procedure, see United States v. Morrison, 49 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S., 
Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 79-395). Indeed, some authorities have gone so far as to suggest that 
a federal judicial order precluding the executive branch of the federal government from 
exercising discretion to prosecute a criminal cause might be unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the principle of separation of powers. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 
433 (1956) (quoting favorably from Judge Weinfeld's opinion in the court below); Cox, 
Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 394 (1976). 
•• The one possible exception is the priest-penitent privilege. It is not unreasonable to 
assume that if assertion of a priest-penitent privilege would deny a defendant a fair trial, 
the legislature that created the privilege would wish the courts to rule as a matter of law 
that the prosecution ought to be dismissed, rather than leave the decison to _the prosecu-
tion. To that extent, Professor Hill and I are in agreement. 
•• See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 
1154-78, 183-85, 186-90, 207-12 (1969). 
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the legislature wishes to delegate the choice of remedies to only 
one of the two branches of government, it must delegate it to the 
prosecution, because the prosecution is the only one of the two 
branches that can make an autonomous choice between dismis-
sal and disclosure. This is so, because courts cannot effectively 
compel the prosecution to pursue a case it wishes to drop.31 For 
both these reasons, legislatures are naturally inclined to allow 
the prosecution to decide on the appropriateness of dismissal 
rather than to delegate authority to the courts to dismiss cases 
over the prosecution's objection. Given a legislature's desire to 
delegate the choice of remedies to the prosecution (or given an 
inference of such a desire), a court cannot lawfully take it upon 
itself to make a unilateral decision to dismiss a case over the 
prosecution's objection. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF ENTITLEMENT 
In addition to the issue of remedies, Professor Hill also ques-
tions whether certain criminal defendants are ever entitled on 
the merits to any relief at all from assertions of privilege. He 
starts by distinguishing between two classes of privileges: (1) all 
privileges asserted by prosecution witnesses on cross examina-
tion or government privileges asserted by defense witnesses, and 
(2) private privileges asserted by defense witnesses. As he par-
'tially explains in a subsequent section of his Article, he believes 
that criminal defendants are entitled to relief from private privi-
leges asserted by prosecution witnesses in the course of cross-
examination and from government privileges asserted by defense 
witnesses - or, perhaps more accurately, that they are entitled 
81 If I understand him correctly, Professor Hill appears to admit as much. See Hill, 
supra note 3, at 1187 n.65, 1192. See note 11 supra. For a discussion of the practical 
(and principled) objections to compelling the executive branch to prosecute a criminal 
case that it wishes to dismiss, see Note, 9 SUFF. U. L. REv. 1434 (1975). Indeed, some 
authorities have gone so far as to suggest that a federal judicial order compelling the 
executive branch of the federal government to press a criminal case it wishes to drop 
might violate the principle of separation of powers. See Newman v. United States, 382 
F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.); Note, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 · 
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 394 (1976). Of course it is true that the executive branch can-
not itself compel the courts to participate in prosecutions they wish to avoid. The differ-
ence is, however, that once the legislature vests exclusive, lawful discretion in the execu-
tive branch to decide between dismissal and disclosure, the courts cannot frustrate a 
lawful executive decision to prosecute without themselves flagrantly violating the law on 
the record; in contrast, if the legislature were to vest exclusive discretion in the courts, 
the prosecution could effectively frustrate a judicial decision to pursue a case by engag-
ing in acts of omission and neglect, short of openly violating an order to prosecute. 
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to relief on a lesser showing of cause.82 His instant objection con-
cerns whether a defendant is ever entitled to relief from asser-
tions of private privilege by witnesses of his own. 
Professor Hill, in challenging a defendant's right to plead for 
relief from private privileges asserted by his own witnesses, 
starts with a premise which he believes generates a paradox. His 
premise is that there exist only two ways to respond to a defen-
dant's plea for relief from a witness' assertion of privilege: either 
override the privilege entirely by compelling the witness to tes-
tify in open court, or sustain the privilege by allowing the wit-
ness to remain entirely silent. 88 Given the drastic impact of the 
former alternative on the witness, the defendant should be re-
quired to demonstrate in open court the actual necessity of full 
disclosure. As Professor Hill puts it, "a defendant claiming a 
constitutional detriment should be required to make a substan-
tial and specific showing, based on something more than his 
own bare assertions, that the witness' testimony, if given, would 
tend to be exculpatory."" Yet the very nature of such a required 
showing results in a paradox: either the defendant cannot mar-
shall in advance sufficient evidence to justify compelling the wit-
ness to testify in open court, in which event his claim fails on its 
merits; or he can marshall such evidence in advance, in which 
event his request for additional evidence from the privileged 
witness should be dismissed as "incremental"811 and, hence, 
superfluous. 88 
I shall postpone until Part III my reasons for questioning Pro-
fessor Hill's distinction between witnesses for the prosecution 
and witnesses for the defense, as well as his distinction between 
defense witnesses' asserting government privileges and defense 
u Hill, supra note 3, at 1190, 1193. 
u Needlesa to say, Profesaor Hill does not make this asaumption concerning statutory 
privileges that explicitly provide for in camera inspection on a lesser showing of cause 
than inspection in open court. The legislature in such cases clearly believes disclosure in 
camera to be a lesaer intrusion on the underlying interest in confidentiality than dis-
closure in open court. Profesaor Hill's asaumption, rather, is directed toward the great 
majority of privileges that do not explicitly envisage in camera inspection as an interme-
diate level of disclosure. With regard to privileges that "cannot fairly be read as making 
an exception for in camera disclosure" (Id. at 1188), Profesaor Hill assumes that in cam-
era disclosure intrudes on confidentiality interests as much as disclosure in open court 
and, hence, that courts are constitutionality "powerlesa" to require in camera inspection. 
Id. at 1194. 
04 Id. at 1182. 
" Id. at 1183. 
ae As Professor Hill puts it, "[t]his approach to the problem produces the apparent 
anomaly that the defendant's showing of entitlement to a remedy tends to establish that 
he does not need the remedy." Id. 
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witnesses' asserting private privileges. In Parts II A and B be-
low, I argue that (1) Professor Hill's premise regarding the un-
differentiated burdens of disclosure does not hold true for most 
privileges, and (2) even where the premise holds true, his conclu-
sion regarding the superfluousness of redress does not follow 
from his premise. 
A. Professor Hill's Premise: The "Pregnancy" Nature of 
Privileges 
In arguing that relief from privileges is either unjustified or 
superfluous, Professor Hill presumes that privileges are like 
pregnancy. One cannot be a "little" pregnant; one is either en-
tirely pregnant, or not pregnant at all. The same holds true, so 
the premise goes, regarding the impairment of testimonial privi-
leges. There are no gradations·or degrees of impairment. Unless 
a legislature provides to the contrary, a privilege is destroyed as 
much by disclosure to a single person - even to a trial judge in 
camera - as by disclosure to the whole world. 
This "pregnancy" theory of privileges may accurately describe 
some privileges. The privilege against self-incrimination, for ex-
ample, is as much impaired by compelled disclosure to a magis-
trate in camera as to the whole world.87 Indeed, the latter privi-
lege may be more impaired by disclosure to a magistrate than to 
the whole world. In that respect, however, the privilege against 
self-incrimination is sui generis and (contrary to what Professor 
Hill implies) disanalogous to other privileges. 88 This point can 
be illustrated by considering the priyilege of alleged rape victims 
regarding their prior sexual conduct. Disclosure to a judge in 
camera impairs the privilege less than disclosure to the judge 
plus his law clerk; disclosure to the judge and his law clerk im-
pairs less than disclosure restricted to defense counsel alone; dis-
closure to defense counsel alone impairs less than disclosure to 
the jury in a nonpublic trial; and disclosure to a jury impairs less 
than disclosure to the newspapers. 89 In short, like many privi-
" See Confrontation, supra note 17, at 581 n.38. 
18 It ia no accident that Professor Hill repeatedly turns to the privilege against self-
incrimination to illustrate his thesia. See Hill, supra note 3, at 1181-82, 1186, 1193. The 
privilege against self-incrimination ideally supports hia thesia, because it ia a privilege for 
which in camera inspection ia unavailable as a mediating procedure. The problem ia not 
the illustration, but the wholly unsupported implication that the privilege against self-
incrimination ia typical of other privileges. For the proposition that the privilege against 
self-incrimination ia atypical, see Westen-: supra note 17, at 581 n.38. 
18 See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
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leges, the rape victim's privilege protects an interest in privacy 
that can be impaired in degrees, depending on the constituency 
and size of the audience. 
The gradational nature of such privileges bears directly upon 
the kind of showing a defendant must make in order to compel a 
witness to testify. With respect to privileges that are destroyed 
as much by disclosure to a trial judge in camera as by disclosure 
in a public trial, a defendant has no alternative but to try in a 
single preliminary stage to marshall sufficient evidence to justify 
overriding the privilege - presumably to make what Professor 
Hill calls "a substantial and specific showing . . . that the wit-
ness's testimony . . . would tend to be exculpatory. ""0 On the 
other hand, with respect to privileges that are not as impaired 
by disclosure to a trial judge in camera as by disclosure to the 
world, a defendant can make his required showing in gradational 
stages: at each stage he need only make the degree of showing 
required for the restricted sort of disclosure at issue, thereby ob-
taining evidence for subsequent and fuller stages of disclosure. 
Unlike the previous defendant who must possess in advance all 
evidence needed to pierce a privilege tout a coup, the latter de-
fendant, who starts with less evidence, can pierce the privilege in 
stages, using the already-acquired, privileged information to jus-
tify the further disclosures to which he may thereby become 
entitled. 
Taglianetti v. United States"1 provides a good example of 
how a court should treat gradational privileges. The defendant 
in Taglianetti sought to compel the government to produce the 
logs of certain illegally recorded telephone conversations in dero-
gation of the government's asserted privilege for national de-
fense secrets. The Court had previously held that a defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to compel disclosure in open court of 
privileged information regarding illegal surveillance, but only if 
he can show that the overheard conversation was his. The defen-
dant in Taglianetti could not make a sufficient showing to that 
effect, because while he could show that the government had re-
corded other conversations of his on the same telephone, he 
could not adequately rebut the government's denial that the re-
quested conversations were his. The Court could, perhaps, have 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 37-38, 83-84, 88-96 (1977); Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield 
Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 590 (1980). Interestingly, Pro-
fessor Hill admits that "disclosure to the court in camera is a far cry from disclosure to 
the defendant." Hill, supra note 3, at 1175 n.10. 
•• Hill, supra note 3, at 1182. 
" 394 U.S. 316 (1969). 
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concluded that the government's privilege for national security 
secrets would be impaired as much by disclosure to the trial 
judge in camera as by disclosure to the defendant in open court. 
In that event, the Court would presumably have denied the de-
fendant's request on the ground that he had failed to make the 
kind of showing required for disclosure of the privileged infor-
mation in open court. Instead, the Court held that the defen-
dant's showing, though not sufficient to justify adversary disclo-
sure in open court, nevertheless sufficed to justify restricted 
disclosure to the trial judge in camera - thus implicitly holding 
that the government's privilege for national security secrets was 
such that it would be impaired less by disclosure in camera than· 
by disclosure in open court. 41 Because of the gradational nature 
of the privilege, the defendant was given an opportunity to 
pierce the privilege in stages by making a showing that, though 
insufficient for open disclosure on an adversary basis, nonethe-
less sufficed for in camera inspection. The particular benefit to 
the defendant is a stepped process of "bootstrapping": the stage 
of in camera inspection may produce sufficient additional infor.: 
mation to justify the subsequent stage of adversary disclosure in 
open court. 48 
To be sure, Professor Hill has something to say about grada-
tional disclosures of the foregoing kind. He accepts the possibil-
ity of bootstrapping through in camera inspections, but only 
where the legislative authority that creates the privilege ac-
knowledges that in camera inspection is less intrusive than dis-
closure in open court. He rejects bootstrapping with regard to 
privileges that do not explicitly envisage in camera inspection.'' 
In his view, therefore, the opportunity for in camera inspection 
depends entirely on state law. With regard to privileges that a 
state has declared to be "absolute" - or with regard to privi-
leges that a state has declared to be as sensitive to in camera 
inspection as to disclosure in open court - in camera inspection 
•• The Court implicitly acknowledges the government's "national security interest" in 
the secrecy of information relating to foreign intelligence gathering. See Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 n.15 (1969). See also id. at 197-200 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring & dissenting); id. at 209-211 (Fortas, J., concurring & dissenting). 
" The Court reasoned in a similar way in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
The Nixon Court held that the special prosecutor was entitled to an in camera inspec-
tion of constitutionally privileged communication between the President and his advisors 
upon a lesser showing of need than would be required for complete disclosure in open 
court, thereby implicitly holding an in camera inspection was less of an intrusion on the 
constitutional interest underlying the President's executive privilege than disclosure in 
open court. See 418 U.S. at 713-16. 
" See Hill, supra note 3, at 1189, 1194. 
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is constitutionally unavailable as a mediating device. 
The problem with the aforementioned position is that it erro-
neously assumes that a legislature's labels are constitutionally 
conclusive and that courts are constitutionally precluded from 
piercing state-created privileges to assess the relative weights of 
the underlying interests.46 Courts may be bound by a state's 
characterization of the interests underlying its rules when courts 
pass solely on issues of state law. Courts are not so bound, how-
ever, in resolving federal claims that turn on relative assess-
ments of state and federal interests. For in order to demarcate 
the scope of federal rights, a court must be able to make an in:-
dependent assessment of the strength and scope of the compet-
ing state interests on the other side. Thus, as Professor Hill him-
self acknowledges, a court may inquire into the strength of a so-
called "absolute" privilege in order to decide whether a defen-
dant has made a sufficient constitutional showing to override the 
privilege altogether.'8 By the same token, a court may inquire 
into the relative strength of a privilege in order to decide 
whether a defendant has made a sufficient showing to justify the 
•• As Professor Hill puts it, "(I]t is inappropriate for courts ... to rule that some 
legislative determinations to protect confidentiality are entitled to greater respect than 
others." Id. at 1189. Ironically, in his discussion of government privileges, Professor Hill 
admits that in order to assess a defendant's constitutional claim, the courts must assess 
the state's "interest in maintining secrecy," including its separate "interest" regarding 
"in camera submission[s]." Id. at 1191-92. 
•• In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the Court examined a state statute which 
created an absolute privilege for the confidentiality of information relating to the adjudi-
cation of juvenile deliquency. Nonetheless, because the interest underlying the defen-
dant's constitutional claim clashed with the interest underlying the state-created privi-
lege, the Court felt obliged and entitled to make an independent assessment of the 
strength of the state interest underlying the privilege. Having assessed the state's asser-
tion of interest by constitutional standards of review, the Court concluded that the de-
fendant's constitutional interests were paramount: 
The claim is made that the State has an important interest in protecting the 
anonymity of juvenile offenders and that this interest outweighs any competing 
interest this petitoner might have in cross-examining [the juvenile witness] 
about his being on probation. . . . 
We do not and need not challenge the State's interest as a matter of its own 
policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to preserve the anonymity 
of a juvenile offender .... [For in] this setting we conclude that the right of 
confrontation is paramount to the state's policy of protecting a juvenile offender. 
Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to [the juvenile witness] or his 
family by disclosure of his juvenile record . . . is outweighed by petitioner's right 
to probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identifi-
cation witness. 
Id. at 319. In other words, although the state of Alaska characterized its interest in the 
confidentiality of juvenile court records to be superior to the defendant's interest in ob-
taining evidence in his defense, the Court made its own independent assessment and 
came to a contrary conclusion. 
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more limited intrusion of in camera inspection.47 
To be sure, this is not to say that an in camera inspection has 
no effect at all on the integrity of a privilege, or that state asser-
tions regarding in camera inspection can be completely disre-
garded. Any compelled inspection, even in camera, may intrude 
to some extent upon the confidentiality interests that a privilege 
serves. The point is, rather, that in assessing a defendant's con-
stitutional claim to a fair trial, a court may legitimately find (1) 
that despite a state's characterizations to the contrary, the state 
has less of a genuine interest in preserving confidentiality from a 
trial judge in camera than from the public as a whole,48 and (2) 
" See State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, _, 557 P.2d 1359, 1362-67 (1976) (Fort, J., con-
curring & dissenting). Judge Fort noted that although the statute creates an absolute 
privilege for a complaining witness' prior sexual conduct, courts should construe the stat-
ute to avoid constitutional conflicts with the right of a defendant to present evidence in 
his defense. So construing it, he felt the court should conclude that in camera inspection 
is less of an intrusion on the interests protected by the privilege than disclosure in open 
court. 
'
8 In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), for example, the Court was presented 
with a state statute which prohibited criminal defendants from calling accomplices as 
witnesses for the defense. The statute was based on the assumption that an accomplice's 
testimony is unreliable, and that the state's interest in shielding the jury from unreliable 
testimony could only be fully served by excluding the testimony altogether. Nonetheless, 
because the interest protected by the state's action conflicted with the defendant's right 
to present evidence in his own behalf, the Court made its own independent assessment of 
the strength of the state's interest. Having done so, the Court concluded that given the 
drastic effect of outright exclusion on the defendant's interest in presenting evidence in 
his defense, the state's interest in ensuring the reliability of criminal evidence would be 
adequately served by allowing the evidence to be admitted under cautionary instructions 
to the jury. Thus, although the state legislature had determined that outright exclusion 
was the only remedy that would fully serve its interests, the Court felt obliged and enti-
tled to make its own independent assessment of the issue in the course of fashioning a 
constitutional remedy for the assertion of a constitutional right. See Compulsory Process 
II, supra note 17, at 198-204. 
A court cannot disregard everything a state says regarding the interests it wishes to 
safeguard. On the contrary, courts can and must attend to a state's expression of its 
interests in order to know what to place in the constitutional balance. The point is that 
the courts look to the state's representations as evidence of the state's real inter-
ests-interests that courts are authorized to ascertain for themselves. 
This proposition, viz., that the courts are constitutionally authorized to make their 
own independent determinations of state interests, can be stated in a strong or a weak 
form. Under the weak form, a court may not disregard what it knows to be a state's 
statements of its own interests. The court, however, may disregard a state's superficial 
characterization of its interests when the latter conflicts with what the totality of the 
state's conduct suggests its real interests to be. In that event, the court does not set aside 
a state's statements of its own interests. Rather, the court makes a judgment that the 
state's statements as to its interests are contradictory, and that the court must give ef-
fect to what it believes the state really states its interests to be. 
According to the strong form of the proposition, courts do have constitutional author-
ity to disregard what a state unequivocably declares the weight of its interests to be. To 
illustrate the force of this argument, assume that a state has two separate interests-X 
and Y-that it declares to be of precisely equal weight. Assume further that a court has 
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that such a finding entitles a defendant to an in camera inspec-
tion upon a lesser showing of cause than would be required for 
disclosure in open court. When a court thus invalidates a privi-
lege for the purpose of in camera inspection, it draws its author-
ity from the same source that empowers it to take the more 
drastic step of invalidating a privilege altogether - the power of 
courts to fashion constitutional remedies for the assertion of 
constitutional rights.49 
B. Professor Hill's Conclusion: The Superfiuousness of 
Exculpatory Evidence 
To recapitulate for a moment, Professor Hill proceeds from 
the premise that (unless a legislature specifically provides other-
wise) disclosure of privileged information is an all-or-nothing 
matter. Based on that premise, he concludes that regardless of 
the kind of showing a defendant makes to override an assertion 
of privilege by a witness of his own, a defendant is doomed to 
fail. This is so, he argues, because the defendant either can 
make a "substantial and specific" showing that the witness 
possesses exculpatory evidence, or he cannot. If he cannot, his 
claim fails for insufficiency; if he can, his claim fails for super-
fluousness, because by hypothesis he already possesses so much· 
exculpatory information that further disclosures would be 
"incremental. "110 
I have argued thus far that Professor Hill is mistaken in his 
premise regarding the all-or-nothing nature of privileges. With 
rare exceptions, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, 
state-protected interests in confidentiality are affected less by 
disclosures in camera than by disclosures in open court. I shall 
now argue that even where Professor Hill's premise holds true, 
his conclusion regarding the superfluousness of further disclo-
sures does not follow from his premise. (Nor does it follow that 
previously determined that interest X is not sufficient to override a constitutional right 
of, say, free speech. What happens if a case now arises in which a court determines that 
interest Y conflicts with a right of free speech? Is the court obliged to conclude that 
because the right of free speech overrode interest X, and because the state says that 
interests X and Y are of equal weight, that the rights of free speech must also be deemed 
to override interest Y? Or is the court free to say that the two state interests are not of 
equal weight although the state says they are? If a court can do the latter, then it follows 
that courts do have constitutional authority to make their own assessments of the nature 
and weight of state interests, state declarations to the contrary notwithstanding. 
•• See, e.g., State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, -, 557 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1976) (Fort, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
•• Hill, supra note 3, at 1183. 
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the remedy of allowing a jury to draw an inference from a wit-
ness' assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination must be 
based on the same showing required to compel a witness to tes-
tify under a grant of use immunity).111 
Whether or not such disclosures are superfluous depends upon 
the constitutional standard for determining the materiality of 
exculpatory evidence in criminal cases. If privileged information 
is "immaterial" in a constitutional sense, it is superfluous and a 
defendant cannot complain about its exclusion. If, on the other 
hand, privileged information is "material" in a constitutional 
sense, then it is not superfluous and a defendant has a right to 
insist upon its admission into evidence. 112 
Fortunately, the Court has articulated a fairly clear standard 
of materiality. With regard to information unprotected by privi-
lege (or, as here, information no longer protected by privilege), a 
defendant can demand any item of evidence that may be even 
"merely helpful"113 to his defense. Presumably that means any 
item of evidence that "could . . . in any reasonable likelihood 
01 As Professor Hill recognizes, there is a direct relationship between the "size" of a 
showing a defendant must make in order to obtain relief from a privilege and the intru-
siveness of the remedy he seeks. The more a remedy intrudes upon legitimate state inter-
ests, the more a defendant must show in the way of cause; the less a remedy intrudes 
upon legitimate interest, the less a defendant must show in the way of need. See id. at 
1181, 1193 & n.85. It is also apparent that drawing an inference from a witness' assertion 
of the privilege against self-incrimination is a less intrusive remedy than compelling the 
government to grant the witness use immunity. The inference imposes no burden on the 
prosecution that is not imposed by every probative inference in a defendant's favor. It 
imposes no burden on the witness as long as he is not himself on trial. An order granting 
use immunity, on the other hand, imposes a considerable burden on the prosecution, 
making it difficult for the prosecution to marshall a successful case against the witness in 
the future. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 n.4 (2d Cir .. 1980), cert. 
denied 49 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1981) (No. 80-436). Consequently, since the 
"size" of a defendant's showing depends on the intrusiveness of the remedy he seeks, and 
since the remedy of drawing an inference from assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination is less intrusive than compelling a grant of use immunity, it follows that a 
defendant is entitled to an inference on a lesser showing than would be required to over-
ride the privilege altogether. 
With respect to the remedy of compelling testimony under grants of use immunity, I 
must differ with Professor Hill regarding the state of the law. He says that the proposal 
for defense witness immunity has "not borne significant fruit." Hill, supra note 3, at 
1194. In fact, it is an issue on which the federal courts and state courts are now sharply 
divided. Compare United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 49 
U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1981) (No. 80-436), with Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). Compare also People v. Sapia, 48 App. Div. 2d 524, 
528, 370 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (1975), atf'd, 41 N.Y.2d 160, 359 N.E.2d 688, 391 N.Y.S.2d 93 
(1976), cert. denied 434 U.S. 823 (1977), with State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 321 
N.E.2d 891 (1974) . 
.. See Compulsory Process II, supra note 17, at 214-15. 
•• United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113 n.22 (1976). 
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have affected the judgment of the jury"54- that is, any evidence 
that could raise a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to the 
defendant's guilt. Only the most trivial items of exculpatory evi-
dence fail to satisfy this minimal standard. Once a defendant 
has made a showing sufficient to override. a witness' claim of 
privilege, therefore, the witness would have to show that his ex-
pected testimony falls short of being even "merely helpful" to 
the defense. It is unlikely that a witness in that situation could 
ever make such a showing. It is even less likely that the prosecu-
tion could make such a showing with regard to the probative 
value of an inference from a witness' assertion of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 511 
Ill. PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGES 
Is a defendant ever entitled to constitutional relief from an 
assertion of privilege? Professor Hill, in answering this question, 
separates all assertions of privilege into two distinct categories: 
(1) a category consisting of privileges asserted by prosecution 
witness as well as all government privileges (whether asserted by 
prosecution witnesses or by witnesses for the defense), and (2) a 
category consisting of private privileges asserted by defense wit-
nesses. Professor Hill distinguishes between the two categories 
because he believes that a defendant must have a greater show-
ing of need to obtain relief from assertions of private privileges 
by defense witnesses than from assertions in the first category.56 
He does not explain why prosecution witnesses should be 
treated differently from defense witnesses. He does, however, 
04 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959), quoted favorably in Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
"" An inference is a particularly powerful form of evidence, because it brings to the 
jury's attention the probative value of information it has heard that, without the infer-
ence, it would have a difficult time evaluating for its worth. See Allen, Structuring Jury 
Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary 
Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 330-39 (1980). An inference regarding the probative value 
of a witness' silence is particularly important to the outcome of a case. Given the fact 
that the jury is instructed to draw no inference from the defendant's silence, it may be 
confused about significance of a witneBB' silence. Without instruction on the inference, 
they may have no idea how to asseBB the probative value of the witness' silence. That is 
precisely why the party who benefits from an inference from a witness' silence has such a 
strong interest in litigating the right to have the jury instructed of the inference. See, 
e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 U.S. 2124 (1980). For the law governing the inferences that 
flow from silence, see C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 656 (2d ed. 1972). For the probative 
significance of silence, see Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Nega-
tive Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1011 (1978) . 
.. See Hill, supra note 3, at 1181, 1190. 
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advance two reasons for believing that defense witnesses should 
be treated differently depending upon whether they assert gov-
ernment privileges or private privileges. 
I do not share Professor Hill's confidence in the constitutional 
distinctions he draws. While there are interesting differences be-
tween prosecution witnesses and defense witnesses, 117 as well as 
between government privileges and private privileges, 118 the dis-
tinctions have nothing to with the quantum of evidence that de-
fendant must present in order to become entitled to relief. Pro-
fessor Hill's distinction between prosecution witnesses and 
defense witnesses rests implicitly on an unfounded assumption 
about differences between the right of an accused to "con-
fron[t]" witnesses "against him"69 and his correlative right to 
"obtai[n]" witnesses "in his favor."60 In addition, his distinction 
between government privileges and private privileges finds in-
sufficient support in the two reasons he advances. 
A. The Alleged Distinction Between Defense Witnesses And 
Prosecution Witnesses 
Why would one distinguish between prosecution witnesses and 
defense witnesses in granting a defendant relief from assertions 
of private privilege? The answer surely cannot be found in any 
differences in the importance or magnitude of the underlying 
privilege, because no logical relationship ~xists between the type 
of privilege a witness possesses and the particular party for 
whom he testifies. On the contrary, witnesses possess and assert 
07 One difference does exist between prosecution witnesses and defense witnesses: the 
harm caused by a prosecution witness' assertion of privilege can always be cured either 
by striking the witness' direct testimony or (if a jury is incapable of disregarding the 
evidence) declaring a mistrial and retrying the defendant without the prosecution wit-
ness' testimony; the harm caused by a defendant's assertion of privilege, however, can 
only sometimes be cured by striking a prosecution witness' testimony or declaring a mis-
trial. That is to say, sometimes the defense witness' assertion of privilege has the effect 
not of precluding the defendant from rebutting or impeaching a single prosecution wit-
ness' testimony, but of precluding the defendant from rebutting the very elements of the 
offense charged against him. In the latter event, the only effective remedy for assertion 
of a privilege is either compel the witness to testify or dismiss the prosecution. 
08 One difference between government privileges and private privileges is that a court 
may use the threat of dismissal as a sanction for enforcing a government witness to tes-
tify, while dismissal would be an inappropriate sanction to use against the government 
for a private witness' refusal to testify. See note 18 supra. 
" U.S. CONST. ~end. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him"). 
80 U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor"). 
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privileges without regard to whether they are testifying as wit-
nesses for the prosecution or witnesses for the defense. 
Nor can the answer be found in any difference in the burden-
someness of the respective remedy, because the remedies for a 
witness' assertion of privilege do not depend on the party for 
whom the witness testifies. The appropriateness of the various 
remedies - e.g., dismissing the case, striking the witness' testi-
mony, compelling the witness to testify, or drawing an inference 
from his silence - depends upon the impact of the asserted 
privilege on the defendant's ability to present his defense.e1 Sup-
pose, for example, that an asserted privilege operates to preclude 
a defendant from rebutting the testimony of a prosecution wit-
ness. The proper remedy there is either to strike the witness' 
testimony or to compel the witness to testify, regardless of 
whether the privilege is asserted by a witness for the prosecution 
or by a witness for the defense. This does not mean that the 
showing a defendant must make to obtain relief from a privilege 
is unrelated to the burdensomeness of the remedy, or that dis-
missal burdens the prosecution as much as striking a witness' 
testimony.ea It means, rather, that no necessary connection ex-
ists between the remedy invoked and the identity of the party 
for whom the witness testifies. By the same token, no necessary 
connection exists between the identity of the party for whom a 
witness testifies and the showing a defendant must make to ob-
tain relief from the witness' assertion of a privilege. 
Nor, finally, can the answer be that the direct testimony of a 
prosecution witness who refuses to answer questions on cross ex-
amination becomes too unreliable to be admitted into evidence. 
The constitutional standards that govern the admissibility of in-
criminating evidence are minimal: evidence is admissible unless 
it is so "inherently untrustworthy"e3 or so lacking in "indicia of 
reliability"" as to deprive a jury of "a satisfactory basis for eval-
•• The choice between striking the witness' testimony and proceding with the trial on 
the one hand, or declaring a mistrial on the other, depends upon whether the court feels 
that an instruction to the jury to disregard the witness' testimony would be effective in 
removing the taint. If cautionary instructions are sufficient, there is no need to declare a 
mistrial and start afresh. If, however, the incriniinating evidence is so compelling that 
cautionary instructions would not likely suffice, the appropriate remedy is to declare a 
mistrial and force the prosecution to begin afresh with a jury that has not heard the 
incriminating evidence. See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mica. L. R.Bv. 
71, 163 & n.444, 176-77 (1974). 
•• I agree with Professor Hill that the size of a showing that the defendant must make 
to obtain relief depends upon the intrusiveness or burdensomeness of the remedy he is 
seeking. See Hill, supra note 3, at 1181, 1193 & n.85. See also note 51 supra. 
•• Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953). 
84 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (majority opinion). 
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uating [its] truth."611 Direct testimony by prosecution witnesses, 
delivered under oath in open court and in the presence of the 
defendant and trier of fact, more than satisfies the foregoing 
test, because such testimony exceeds in reliability the. kinds of 
unsworn, out-of-court statements that are routinely admitted in 
the absence of cross-examination. 66 
Moreover, if Professor Hill's exception for prosecution wit-
nesses is based on the alleged unreliability of uncross-examined 
testimony, the exception would have to apply to assertions of 
privilege by some defense witnesses as well. Assume, for exam-
ple, that instead of cross-examining a prosecution witness imme-
diately at the close of his direct testimony, a defendant prefers 
to postpone examining the witness until he can examine the wit-
ness as a witness for the defense; assume further that when the 
defendant calls the witness as a witness for the defense, the wit-
ness asserts a privilege, thus thwarting the defendant's efforts to 
examine him. The witness' assertion of privilege as a witness for 
the defense renders his former testimony just as unreliable as if 
he had asserted it as a witness for the prosecution. 67 
The real basis, I suspect, for distinguishing between prosecu-
tion witnesses and defense witnesses centers on an assumed dif-
ference between the right of a defendant to cross-examine wit-
nesses against him and his correlative right to examine witnesses 
in his favor. The assumption is that when a defendant calls a 
witness as his own, the defendant acts at his peril, and he cannot 
complain if the witness responds by asserting a privilege (unless 
the defendant can show a "substantial and specific" need for 
overriding the privilege). Yet, so the assumption goes, when the 
prosecution calls the witness, the prosecution holds itself out as 
a guarantor that the witness will be available for cross-examina-
tion. Hence, the prosecution must either persuade the witness 
voluntarily to waive his privilege or do without the witness' 
ea California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 191 (1970). See generally Westen, supra note 16, 
at 1198-1200 . 
.. See Westen, supra note 16, at 1212-14 . 
., What is it, after all, that renders the prosecution witness' direct testimony suffi-
ciently unreliable to warrant striking it from the record? If it is the failure or inability of 
the defendant to probe the truth of the witness' testimony, it should make no difference 
whether the failure comes to life immediately after the close of the witness' direct testi-
mony or later in the course of the defendant's case in chief. The only difference between 
the two cases is one of timing. In the first case, the defendant seeks and fails to examine 
the witness directly at the close of his testimony. In the latter case, the defendant -
. preferring to structure the order of his proof differently - tries and fails to examine the 
witness as part of the defendant's case in chief. In either event, the consequence of the 
witness' assertion of privilege renders the prosecution witness' testimony insufficiently 
reliable to be considered by the jury. 
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testimony. 
There are two problems with the foregoing assumption. First 
even if the prosecution were constitutionally required to guaran-
tee that witnesses whose statements the prosecution uses will be 
made available for cross-examination, the guarantee would not 
justify overriding the privileges of prosecution witnesses on a 
lesser showing of cause than is ordinarily required for defense 
witnesses. At most it would mean that in the absence of such 
ordinary cause, the prosecution would have to do without the 
witness' direct testimony. After all, the ability of the witness to 
stand on his claim of privilege should not depend on the prose-
cution's supposed guarantee. The witness' justification for re-
maining silent on cross-examination is the same as he would ad-
vance if examined as a witness for the defense - his legal right . 
to assert a private privilege. His right to stand on his claim or 
privilege should not turn on whether he happens to be called as 
a prosecution witness as opposed to a defense witness. Nor 
should the latter have any bearing on the showing that must be 
made in order to override a witness' assertion of privilege. 
Second, and more serious still, it is wrong to assume that the 
state's obligation to confront a defendant with witnesses 
"against him" exceeds in scope its obligation to produce "wit-
nesses in his favor." As I have argued elsewhere, the confronta-
tion and compulsory process clauses each oblige the government 
to assist the accused in identifying, producing, and presenting 
witnesses in his defense.68 The only significant difference be-
tween the two relates to order of proof: the confrontation clause 
obliges the government to produce and tender for examination 
at the close of their direct testimony all available witnesses 
whose statements it uses in its case in chief; the compulsory pro-
cess clause obliges the government to produce and tender for ex-
amination at the close of its case in chief all other witnesses 
whom the accused wishes to examine. 69 The significant differ-
ence between the two clauses relates to the timing and not the 
scope of the defendant's examination. Consequently, no reason 
exists why a defendant would have a greater right to override a 
prosecution witness' private privilege than a defense witness' 
private privilege, or why the prosecution would have a greater 
. 
.. See generally Confrontation, supra note 17, at 601-24, arguing that the right of 
confrontation and the right of compulsory process are mirror images of one another and, 
hence, equal in scope. 
•• See Westen, Order of Proof: An Accused's Right to Conrol the Timing and Se-
quence in His Defense, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 980-84 (1978). See also Westen, supra note 
16, at 1203-10. 
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obligation to guarantee the availability of a prosecution witness 
than the availability of a defense witness. 
B. The Alleged Distinction Between Private Privileges and 
Government Privileges 
Professor Hill gives two reasons for concluding that a defen-
dant must make a greater showing of need to obtain relief from 
an assertion of private privilege than from an assertion of gov-
ernment privilege: (1) the government has a constitutional 
"duty" to disclose "evidence" in its possession that is "exculpa-
tory or otherwise helpful to the defendant;".,0 and (2) the gov-
ernment, as the holder of the government privileges, can always 
avoid the consequence of mandatory disclosure by simply dis-
missing its case. Both propositions are unquestionably true as 
statements of fact. As explanations, however, they fall short, be-
cause they fail to explain why government privileges should be 
overridden upon lesser showing of needs than private privileges. 
To start with the second of the two explanations, it is per-
fectly true that the government, as the holder of government 
privileges, can ~ways avoid the prospect of disclosure by simply 
dismissing its case. But that hardly explains why the govern-
ment should be confronted with conditional disclosure in the 
first place. Nor does it explain why the government should be 
confronted with a choice between dismissal or disclosure upon a 
lesser showing than would justify compelling disclosure of a pri-
vate privilege. To be sure, once a court determines that a contin-
ued assertion of a government privilege violates a defendant's 
right to a fair trial, the court can properly enforce the right in 
the face of continued wrongful assertion of the privilege by uni-
laterally dismissing the state's case. But the sanction of dismis-
sal only comes into play once a court has made an anterior judg-
ment that an assertion of privilege would deny a defendant a 
fair trial. By itself the potential sanction has no bearing on the 
threshold showing defendant must make to become entitled to 
relief in the first place. 
As for the government's constitutional obligation to disclose 
exculpatory evidence in its possession, two things may be said. 
First, with respect to requested disclosures of exculpatory evi-
dence (which are the only sort at issue here), private witnesses 
also have a legal obligation to give the court whatever truthful 
•• Hill, supra note 3, at 1193-94. 
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exculpatory evidence they possess.71 If the exculpatory evidence 
they possess is unprivileged, the defendant has a right to the 
disclosure without further ado; if their evidence is privileged, the 
defendant has the right to privileged evidence whenever he can 
make a "substantial and specific showing" that its suppression 
would deny him a fair trial. Unless one is willing to argue that 
government privileges do not apply at all in criminal cases (an 
argument that Professor Hill carefully avoids),72 there is no rea-
son to believe that the government's duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence in its possession is greater in scope than the correlative 
duty of private witnesses to do the same. It follows, therefore, 
that as long as the two duties are of equal scope, the defendant 
should have to make the same kind of showing to disgorge privi-
leged evidence from the government as he would have to make 
to disgorge similarly privileged evidence from a private 
witness.73 
Moreover, even if the government has a greater duty than pri-
vate witnesses to disclose privileged evidence, it does not neces-
sarily follow that such disclosure should be triggered by a lesser 
showing of cause. After all, the issue of cause does not arise with 
respect to privileged witnesses who admit that their evidence is 
exculpatory to the degree that justifies overriding the privilege. 
The issue of cause arises only with respect to witnesses who re-
fuse to make such admissions. Thus, with respect to government 
privileges, the issue of cause only arises after a responsible offi-
cial officially asserts that his evidence falls short of the kind that 
the Constitution obligates the government to disclose. State-
ments to that effect by responsible government officials are pre-
sumably entitled to greater weight than the comparable state-
ments of private witnesses. As a consequence, a defendant, if 
anything, should have to make a greater showing of cause to re-
but a government assertion of privilege than a private assertion. 
Hence, even if one assumes, arguendo, that the government has 
a greater duty of disclosure than nongovernmental witnesses, its 
greater degree of duty, nonetheless, may be offset entirely by the 
71 This is what is meant by saying "the public has a right to every man's evidence." 
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 
688 (1972). See also Note, "The Public Has a Claim To Every Man's Evidence": The 
Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1211 & esp. 
n.1 (1978). 
•• See Hill, supra note 3, at 1191. 
•• Interestingly, after suggesting that government privileges and private privileges are 
distinct, id. at 1181, 1190, 1192-94, Professor Hill seems to recognize that the controlling 
consideration in each case is the weight of the interest in confidentiality that the privi-
lege is designed to safeguard. Id. at 1191. 
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compensating factor of greater credibility, thereby leaving the 
defendant in ultimately the same position vis-a-vis government 
as vis-a-vis private privileges. 
In conclusion, no reason exists for subjecting government priv-
ileges to a different standard of disclosure than private privi-
leges. Rather, the kinds of showings that are required to justify 
relief from privileges depends solely upon the respective weight 
of the interests in confidentiality that underlie them. Once the 
weights have been ascertained, the same scale is used to assess 
them, regardless of whether they take the form of government 
privileges or private privileges. 
CONCLUSION 
People who respond to law review articles tend to exaggerate 
their differences at the expense of common agreement. I would 
regret having done so here, because Professor Hill and I agree on 
many things, including the futility of thinking that this is a sub-
ject on which either of us will have the final say. 

